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RECENT CASES
INSURANCE LAW-UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE--
SCOPE OF THE TERM-"UNINSURED MOTORIST"
Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 12 Ariz. App. 2,
467 P. 2d 77 (1970).
The appellant, James T. Porter, was involved in an automo-
bile accident in which he and four other persons were injured.
The tortfeasor was insured to the extent of the statutory mini-
mum ($10,000-$20,000) as provided for by the Arizona Financial
Responsibility Act.' The appellant subsequently obtained a judg-
ment against the tortfeasor for $10,000. He then entered into a
proposed settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer under which he
was to receive $2,500 of the $20,000 of insurance proceeds avail-
able for allocation among the injured parties. Mr. Porter notified
his insurer (the appellee) of the proposed settlement and request-
ed the appellee satisfy the balance of damages under the un-
insured motorist provision of his policy. The appellee denied
coverage and refused to approve or disapprove the proposed set-
tlement. Subsequently, the appellant settled with the tortfeasor's
insurer as agreed, and brought an action against the appellee for
the $7,500 balance under his uninsured motorist coverage.
The trial court dismissed the suit on motion, and on appeal,
the judgment of dismissal was reversed. The appellee denied
liability on three separate grounds. The first two, violation of the
arbitration provision of the policy and violation of the provision
prohibiting the insured from settling without written consent of
the carrier, were summarily dismissed by the Arizona Court of
Appeals. The court stated:
When appellee denied coverage, it was precluded from sub-
sequently invoking the policy provisions which were insert-
ed for its benefit.2
This rationale seems to be in line with generally accepted
case law and contract principles. Either one of two arguments
may be advanced. The insurer, having denied coverage may be
1 Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01.
2 Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 12 Ariz. App. 2, 467 P.
2d 77, 81 (1970).
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said to have waived the provision as to arbitration or settle-
ment.' Alternatively, it may be argued that under general con-
tract law, such a denial of coverage by the insurer prior to the
settlement constituted a breach and as such relieved the other
party from performing any conditions on his part.4
The third ground for denial of liability alleged by the
insurer-appellee was that the tortfeasor was not an "uninsured-
motorist" under the uninsured motorist provision of the appel-
lant's policy with the appellee. It is the court's treatment of this
argument which makes this case unique.
As a basic premise, the court conceded that if the tortfeasor
had available the full statutory minimum of liability insurance,
meeting the minimum limits of the Financial Responsibility Act,
he would not be an uninsured motorist. However, the court ra-
tionalized that,
Where the negligent party's insurance is insufficient to com-pensate a victim to the minimum limits of our Financial Re-
sponsibility Act, in reality the tortfeasor is "partially un-
insured" as to that victim. In keeping with the strong pur-pose of the Financial Responsibility Act, we are of the opin-ion that Porter must be permitted to proceed against his un-insured motorist carrier for his unsatisfied damages, at least
until he has received the minimum protection afforded by
statute .... Whether or not involved in an accident with
multiple injured parties, all victims of automobile accidents
should be assured of at least the statutory minimum level ofprotection. For the injured party to fare better financially ifinjured by one with no insurance, rather than an "under-insured," reaches an inequitable and anomalous result anti-pathetic to the manifest legislative purpose.5 (Emphasis
added).
Elsewhere in the case, the court states that the principal
purpose of the Arizona Financial Responsibility Act is:
3 Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Polchlopek, 18 N.Y. 2d 376, 222 N.E. 2d 383 (1966).
4 In Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 407,62 Cal. Rptr. 177, 180 (1967), the court stated that:
Where a party to an obligation gives notice to another, before the latteris in default, that he will not perform the contract such other party is
entitled to enforce the obligation without previously performing any
conditions on his part in favor of the other party.
5 Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 12 Ariz. App. 2, 467 P.2d77, 80 (1970). But see Detrich v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 158 N.W.2d 99 (1968 Iowa) wherein the court said, the policy was intended to pro-
vide protection against "uninsured" motorists and not "under-insured mo-
torists."
Winter 1971
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 13
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss1/13
RECENT CASES
the protection of the public using the highways from finan-
cial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles
by financially irresponsible persons.
6
It can be readily seen that this court has greatlly extended
the seemingly boilerplate definition of 'uninsured automobile' as
defined in the standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement.
7 The
question now becomes on what grounds can it do so.
It is well settled that, a policy or contract of insurance is to
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly as
against the insurer.
8
However, it is equally well established that this rule applies
only where the language of the contract or policy, after applying
the usual rules of construction, is ambiguous or doubtful and
reasonably susceptible of more than one construction. 9 In this
instance, the language of the policy seems definite and unam-
biguous.
Therefore, it is submitted that this court determined that the
legislative policy of the uninsured motorist statute outweighed
the Standard Insurance Policy provisions. Indeed, the court
spoke in terms of public policy when it cited the following ra-
tionale from two previous court decisions:
In other words, the legislative purpose in creating compul-
sory uninsured motorist coverage was to place the injured
policyholder in the same position he would have been in if
the tortfeasor had had liability insurance .... 10
6 Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 12 Ariz. App. 2, 467 P.2d
77, 79 (1970).
7 The Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement defines "uninsured auto-
mobile" as:
1. An automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of
which there is, in at least amounts specified by the financial responsi-
bility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally
garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization
legally responsible for the use of such automobile, or with respect to
which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy appli-
cable at the time of the accident, but the company writing the same de-
nies coverage thereunder; or,
2. a hit-and-run automobile.
8 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 271 (1969). This principle was applied to un-
insured motorist coverage in Mills v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 231 Cal. App.
2d 124, 41 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1964).
9 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 273 (1969).
10 Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 467 P. 2d 77, 80 (1970),
quoted from Peterson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany, 238 Or. 106, 393 P. 2d 651, 653 (1964).
3
Fox: Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
4 AKRON LAW REVIEW (1)
The provision defining an uninsured motorist in the policy
and excluding from the category any motorist carrying the
statutory minimum, intrudes into the Act and entrenches
upon the legislative purpose and is, therefore, null and
void."
If this case stands, it is submitted that the term "uninsured
motorist" has been redefined to add another class of insureds to
the growing list, which roughly would incorporate the following
instances where the insured was injured:
(1) by a hit-and-run driver;
(2) by a tortfeasor having absolutely no bodily injury liabil-
ity bond or insurance;
(3) by a tortfeasor having a bodily injury liability bond or
insurance, but not sufficient to satisfy the statutory minimum as
set forth under the Financial Responsibility Act;
(4) by a tortfeasor having a bodily injury liability bond or
insurance in an amount satisfying his own state's Financial Re-
sponsibility Act, but not sufficient to satisfy the Financial Re-
sponsibility Act of the state wherein the accident occurred and
in which the claim was brought; 12
(5) by a tortfeasor having insurance which satisfies the re-
quirements of all applicable Financial Responsibility statutes
concerned, but by virtue of multiple injuries is unable to provide
insurance coverage sufficient to indemnify each injured party to
the statutory minimum required for a single injured party.
In addition to the foregoing, the court made another policy
decision regarding the $2,500 recovered under the settlement. In
citing case authority it declared that:
Since a recovery under one's liability coverage will not deny
recovery under his uninsured motorist provision, we do notbelieve a recovery from the tortfeasor's insurance below the$10,000 minimum should prevent one, in a proper case, from
recovering under his uninsured motorist provision. 3
It also noted language from the Geyer case 14
11 Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 467 P. 2d 77, 81 (1970),paraphrasing Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 447 P. 2d556, 558-559 (1968).
12 Buglione v. Motor Vehicle Acci. Indemnification Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d
525, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 661.
13 Supra, note 2.
14 Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 447 P. 2d 556, 559(1968).
Winter 1971
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... that the prescribed limits of our uninsured motorist
legislation are a part of every policy issued containing such
coverage, and that the prescribed limits cannot be reduced
by offsetting policy provisions.
Following this rationale, the court would award the total
coverage of $7,500 (assuming this to be the policy limits) rather
than $5,000 ($7,500 less $2,500 recovered), where the judgment
was $10,000 or greater. A number of jurisdictions would take
a contrary position with regards to set-offs. 15 They would argue
that if the insurer is to pay under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision, then it should be entitled to all amounts recovered out-
side the policy. Although there is a split of authority as to
"other insurance" provisions, there is some support for the in-
stant court's analogy to be found in cases in addition to the Ari-
zona case cited. In White vs. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,16 the
court in answering the question whether such amounts paid on
behalf of an "uninsured motorist" should be applied first to re-
duce the liability of the insurance carrier or to reduce the loss
of the injured party, decided that the policy behind the uninsured
motorist statute was not to limit recovery to the amount avail-
able to the injured party had he been injured by an insured
driver, but to provide a limit of recovery in the amount of the
judgment against the tortfeasor, subject to the policy limit of the
uninsured motorist endorsement.
Absent a statutory definition of "uninsured motorist," the
court under its powers of construction must, in a functional sense,
legislate the gap-filling language. The outcome elsewhere on
facts similar to those in Porter will depend, in part, on whether
the legislature in adopting uninsured motorist statutes, have in-
corporated a definition of its terms.
DENNIS J. Fox
15 For a good treatment of this subject including case citations see 28 A.L.R.
3rd 551.
16 White v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (C.A. 4 Va.), 361 F. 2d 785 (1966).
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